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ABSTRACT
AI algorithms increasingly make decisions that impact entire groups of humans. Since humans tend
to hold varying and even conflicting preferences, AI algorithms responsible for making decisions
on behalf of such groups encounter the problem of preference aggregation: combining inconsistent
and sometimes contradictory individual preferences into a representative aggregate. In this paper,
we address this problem in a real-world public health context: kidney exchange. The algorithms that
allocate kidneys from living donors to patients needing transplants in kidney exchange matching
markets should prioritize patients in a way that aligns with the values of the community they serve,
but allocation preferences vary widely across individuals. In this paper, we propose, implement and
evaluate a methodology for prioritizing patients based on such heterogeneous moral preferences.
Instead of selecting a single static set of patient weights, we learn a distribution over preference
functions based on human subject responses to allocation dilemmas, then sample from this distribution
to dynamically determine patient weights during matching. We find that this methodology increases
the average rank of matched patients in the sampled preference ordering, indicating better satisfaction
of group preferences. We hope that this work will suggest a roadmap for future automated moral
decision making on behalf of heterogeneous groups.
1 Introduction
As AI algorithms become increasingly powerful and more widely deployed, it is vital that they act in a way that aligns
with human values. Unfortunately, in most real-world domains, people do not unanimously agree on a single set of
“human values” that AI algorithms can model and instantiate. Instead, groups of humans tend to hold varying and even
conflicting moral preferences, and AI algorithms responsible for making decisions on behalf of these heterogeneous
groups must aggregate and arbitrate between these preferences.
Many existing approaches to preference aggregation for AI rely on determining a single representative objective or
decision for the AI to implement [9, 16, 6]. However, humans are known for their variable and contradictory preferences,
meaning that many individuals will hold preferences that differ greatly from the mean. Better techniques are required to
model such heterogeneous human preferences, implement them in AI algorithms, and measure their satisfaction in
practice.
One domain in which this is particularly apparent is that of kidney exchange. In a kidney exchange, patients who
need kidney transplants and have found willing but medically incompatible donors are matched and exchange kidneys
with other such incompatible patient-donor pairs [12]. Many countries, including the United States [7], the United
Kingdom [10] and much of Europe [4] use algorithms developed in the AI community to automate this matching.
Since the prognosis for patients who do not receive kidney transplants is quite poor, these automated decisions have
life-or-death consequences and great moral import. It is therefore vital that these allocation decisions are made in
a way that aligns with societal values. Previous work has sought to learn a single static utility function that kidney
allocation algorithms can use to prioritize certain types of matching [8]. However, that work disregards the empirical
heterogeneity in human ethical judgements in this domain. We seek to instead model this heterogeneity by developing a
methodology that represents the full distribution of human judgements.
In this work, we draw on preference aggregation and social welfare theory to design, implement and evaluate a
methodology for autonomously allocating kidneys to patients in matching markets based on the heterogeneous moral
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Figure 1: Example compatibility graph. Donor and patient blood types are in parentheses and arrows indicate possible
valid donations. This graph has two valid donation cycles: cA = {v1, v2} and cB = {v2, v3}. However, both contain
v2, so only one set of donations can take place.
preferences expressed by surveyed human participants. We propose an alternate model for aggregating preferences
drawn from the economics literature and an alternate domain-specific measure of group welfare based on individual
preference rankings. We show that our proposed model, which aggregates individual preferences into a distribution over
utility functions instead of a single function, improves the average rank of the matched kidney donations in individuals’
preference orderings, without reducing the number of patients that can be matched overall. Incorporating the model
into this real-world AI system leads to more beneficial outcomes according to our proposed measure of social welfare.
We hope that this work will both highlight the preference aggregation challenges present in many allocative AI systems,
and serve as a roadmap for developing systems that directly address these challenges in other real-world contexts.
2 Kidney Exchanges
2.1 Graph Formulation
In a kidney exchange, patients who need a kidney transplant and donors who are willing to donate to them but are
medically incompatible can be matched with other such patient-donor pairs [12]. For example, if the donor of pair i is
compatible with the patient of pair j, and the donor of pair j is likewise compatible with the patient of pair i, they can
form a matching, in which donor di donates to patient pj and donor dj donates to patient pi.
In the standard formulation, a kidney exchange is described by a compatibility graphG = 〈V,E〉 [12, 13]. We construct
one vertex v for each patient-donor pair, then add a directed edge ei,j from vi to vj if di is compatible with pj . A cycle
c is a possible sequence of valid transplants, in which each donor in the cycle donates a kidney and each patient receives
one. A matching M is a set of disjoint cycles. An example compatibility graph is shown in Figure 1. Each oval in the
figure represents a vertex, and each arrow represents a directed edge signifying donor-patient compatibility. There are
two cycles in this particular compatibility graph: cA = {v1, v2} and cB = {v2, v3}. However, these two cycles are not
disjoint, because they share vertex v2. The v2 donor cannot donate both of their kidneys, so these exchanges cannot
both take place. This compatibility graph therefore has two valid matchings, MA = {cA} and MB = {cB}, each with
cardinality 2.
2.2 Clearing Algorithm
The clearing house problem in kidney exchange is to find the optimal valid matching, according to some utility
function [1]. Finding valid matchings with a finite limit on cycle lengths is NP-hard [1] and difficult to approximate [3],
so this problem is typically solved by formulating it as a linear program (LP) and solving it with an LP-solver such as
CPLEX.
We typically assign a weight we to each edge e to represent the utility of that particular donation taking place. In the
national US exchange, these weights are set ad-hoc by a committee [15], but in this work we will adapt an alternative
method that learns these weights based on human responses to allocation dilemmas [8]. The clearing house problem is
to find the optimal matching M∗ which maximizes some utility function u : M → R. This is typically formalized as
the graph-theoretic problem of finding the maximum weighted cycle cover u(M) =
∑
c∈M
∑
e∈c we. To solve this
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Profile Age Drinking Cancer
1 30 rare healthy
2 30 frequently healthy
3 30 rare cancer
4 30 frequently cancer
5 70 rare healthy
6 70 frequently healthy
7 70 rare cancer
8 70 frequently cancer
Table 1: Patient profile descriptions enumerated and (arbitrarily) numbered by Freedman et al.
via linear programming, let C(L) be the set of all cycles of length no more than L, let wc =
∑
c∈C(L) we, create an
activation variable xc ∈ 0, 1 for each cycle c ∈ C(L), then solve the following linear program:
max
∑
c∈C(L)
wc xc s.t .
∑
c:v∈c
xc ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ V. (1)
using an LP-solver such as CPLEX. The final matching M is the set of cycles c with an activation xc = 1. If all edge
weights we are equal, then solving this LP gives a maximum-cardinality matching. In cases where there are multiple
valid matchings of equivalent cardinality, such as MA and MB in Figure 1, this LP-solver must choose between them
randomly. However, if the edge weights are set according to some utility function, then the solution can prioritize
certain types of matches. This allows us to incorporate societal preferences.
2.3 Incorporating Preferences
Previous work has attempted to improve the matching prioritization in kidney exchanges based on sampled human
ethical preferences [8]. All else equal, it is obviously morally preferable to save lives by matching as many patient-donor
pairs as possible. However, in cases such as the one in Figure 1, there can be multiple maximum-cardinality matchings.
In this case, the algorithm requires a utility function that distinguishes between them, ideally in a way that aligns with
human values. The US national kidney exchange attempts to do this, but they prioritize matches in an opaque and
ad-hoc fashion via committee [15]. This excludes most of the societal members who will actually participate in the
exchange from the discussion, and leaves the committee with the still-unsolved problem of designing a utility function
that captures the ethical preferences of an entire society. Freedman et al. propose an alternative methodology for
learning domain-relevant ethical preferences from actual human decisions in kidney allocation dilemmas, revising the
LP in Eq 1 to take these into account, and then evaluating the impact on a simulated exchange. Our work proposes an
improvement on Freedman et al.’s methodology for aggregating preferences and evaluating results, so we will briefly
outline their full methodology here.
Freedman et al. conducted two surveys on participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (“MTurk”). The first
survey asked participants (N = 100) to read a brief description of the kidney transplant waiting list process, and then
asked them to propose which patient characteristics they thought “morally ought” to be used to prioritize patients. The
three most popular categories of responses were “age”, “health – behavioral” (including aspects of health believed to
be under personal control, such as diet and drinking), and “health – general” (including aspects of health unrelated
to kidney disease). The second survey asked a new set of participants (N = 289) to decide how to allocate kidneys
between pairs of fictional patient “profiles” that vary according to these attributes. In order to make the profiles more
concrete, drinking behavior (“1 alcoholic drink per month” or “5 alcoholic drinks per day”) was used as a proxy for
behavioral health, and cancer (“skin cancer in remission” or “no other major health problems”) was used as a proxy
for general health. For example, a sample question asked participants to choose between “Patient W.A. [who] is 30
years old, had 1 alcoholic drink per month (prior to diagnosis), and has no other major health problems” and “Patient
R.F. [who] is 70 years old, had 5 alcoholic drinks per day (prior to diagnosis), and has skin cancer in remission”. They
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defined 8 such patient profiles, with characteristics described in Table 1, and asked each participant to compare each
pair of profiles. We will use these profile descriptions and this preference data in our own work.
Freedman et al. used the Bradley-Terry Model (“BT Model”) to estimate a “BT-score” for each patient profile. The
BT model assumes that each profile x has an underlying score px that represents the value that survey participants
collectively place on donating to a patient with that profile. Under this model, the probability that profile i will be
preferred to profile j is:
P (i > j) =
pi
pi + pj
(2)
Patient profiles that are almost always selected by our survey participants (such as profile 1 in Table 1) will therefore
have the highest scores, and profiles that are rarely selected (such as profile 8), will therefore have the lowest scores.
Freedman et al. use this model to estimate a single set of scores based on the pooled pairwise comparisons from every
survey respondent. This allows them to aggregate all preferences into a single set of scores.
They then revised the LP from Eq 1, setting the weight of each edge ei,j to be the BT-score of the recipient pj and
adding a cardinality constraint to require that the LP still only produce maximum-cardinality matchings. Let wBT (v) be
the BT-score of the patient in vertex v, and let Q be the maximum matching cardinality possible for the compatibility
graph. Then the revised LP is:
max
∑
c∈C(L)
[∑
(u,v)∈c wBT (v)
]
xc
s.t.
∑
c:v∈c xc ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ V∑
c∈C(L) |c|xc ≥ Q
(3)
They evaluated this revised algorithm on a simulated kidney exchange and found that it matched significantly more of
the higher-scoring profiles and significantly fewer of the lower-scoring ones. However, this methodology relies on the
assumption that societal preferences are sufficiently homogeneous to be captured by a single static utility function. An
algorithm using this methodology will always choose to save a patient of profile 1 over a patient of profile 2. However,
the preferences expressed in the survey data actually varied greatly, and participants did sometimes prefer patients of
profile 2 to profile 1. Presumably the preferences of a representative sample of the actual US population would be even
more heterogeneous. In this sense, both the static profile scoring and the assessment of the algorithm by the proportion
of each profile matched are flawed. In this work, we improve upon both of these elements by removing the requirement
for a single utility function and developing an alternate methodology for modifying and evaluating the algorithm.
3 Incorporating Heterogeneous Preferences
In our work we improve upon the methodology presented in Section 2.3 by removing the unrealistic assumption that
societal preferences can be captured by a single utility function. We propose 1) an alternative preference aggregation
method that better captures the variation in expressed preferences, 2) modifications to the kidney allocation algorithm
to take this new preference aggregation into account, and 3) an alternative evaluation metric for the resulting matchings
that lends more consideration to individual welfare.
3.1 Preference Aggregation Model: BLP
Instead of learning a single score for each profile as in previous work [8], we use the Berry-Levinsohn-Pakes Model
(“BLP Model”) to estimate a distribution over possible utility functions. We propose that learning and sampling from
this distribution better satisfies individual preferences than learning a single utility function. The BLP model is an
extension of the logit discrete choice model that is widely used in estimating consumer discrete-choice demand for
differentiated products [2, 11]. When we apply this model to kidney exchange, the “consumers” are members of the
population that the exchange serves, and the “products” are the patients who may potentially be matched with donors.
Using this model allows us to predict how the general population wants the exchange to prioritize patients.
For a graph G = 〈V,E〉, we wish to define a utility function U : V → R that determines the utility of the patient
in each vertex receiving a utility function. The BLP model defines the utility function U(v) = X>p(v)β +  where
Xp(v) = {1(vage = 30),1(vdrinking = rare),1(vcancer = healthy)} are the binary features of the patient profile
of vertex v, β ∼ N (µ,Σ) gives the weight of each feature, and  is an error term following a type-II extreme value
distribution.
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We use maximum likelihood estimation to fit the distribution parameters (µ,Σ) to the pairwise comparison survey data
gathered by Freedman et al. Let P be the set of all patient profiles described in Table 1, and for each pair of profiles
i, j ∈ P , let ck(i, j) be survey respondent k’s preferred profile. This allows us to define the likelihood function
Lk(µ,Σ | ck) = Eβ∼N (µ,Σ)
∏
i,j
exp(X>ck(i,j)β)
exp(X>i β) + exp(X
>
j β)
 (4)
and to estimate the maximum likelihood distribution parameters
µˆ, Σˆ = argmax
µ,Σ
1
N
N∑
k=1
log(Lk(µ,Σ | ck)) (5)
3.2 Algorithm
Each time a new patient-donor pair enters the exchange, we add a corresponding vertex u to the graph, randomly sample
a βu ∼ N (µˆ, Σˆ) from the learned distribution, and weight outgoing edges u→ v using the resulting “BLP function”:
BLP (u, v) = X>p(v)βu + uv . In this way, we represent the full distribution of preferences. Note that the BLP function
indicates a random sample from the surveyed population’s preference distribution – it does not represent the preferences
of donor u specifically. Letting wBLP (u,v) be the score that vertex u’s sampled BLP function places on donating to the
patient in vertex v, we modify the LP in Eq 3 to be:
max
∑
c∈C(L)
[∑
(u,v)∈c wBLP (u,v)
]
xc
s.t.
∑
c:v∈c xc ≤ 1 ∀v ∈ V∑
c∈C(L) |c|xc ≥ Q
(6)
3.3 Evaluation Metric
We further define the rank of a donation u → v to be the position of v’s patient profile in the preference ordering
induced by u’s BLP function. For example, if the BLP function associated with vertex u weights the profile of the
patient in vertex v above all other profiles, rank(u, v) = 1. Conversely, if the BLP function weights the profile below
the other seven possible patient profiles, rank(u, v) = 8. In this context, rank functions as a proxy for individual
welfare because it represents the extent to which an individual’s domain-relevant values were fulfilled. We claim that
the average rank of matched donations is a better measure of the extent to which an algorithm values individual welfare
than the proportion of each profile matched because the ranks of all matches depend on the full BLP distribution. In
contrast, the proportion matched measure relies on the false assumption that everyone’s preferences are better satisfied
if patients with higher BT-scores are matched more often.
We run both algorithms on a simulated kidney exchange, along with a third algorithm that weights all donations equally
as a baseline. We evaluate the resulting matchings both on the proportion of each profile matched, and on our proposed
average rank measure. We find that our proposed algorithm consistently outperforms both others on the rank measure,
suggesting that it better represents the full distribution of societal preferences.
4 Experiments
4.1 Conditions
We tested three versions of the matching algorithm: the baseline one that weights all donations equally, the one with a
single utility function described in Section 2.3, and one with a distribution over utility functions proposed in Section 3.1.
Condition 1: EQUAL The EQUAL algorithm matches kidney exchange participants using the LP in Eq 1. That is, it
weights all participants equally and chooses randomly amongst the highest-cardinality matchings. We use this condition
as a baseline because it describes the case in which ethical preferences are not incorporated into the algorithm at all.
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Condition 2: HOMOGENEOUS The HOMOGENEOUS algorithm matches participants using the LP in Eq 3. It assigns edge
weights based on the BT-score of the recipient, relying on the assumption that individual preferences are sufficiently
homogeneous to be captured by a single static utility function. This is the algorithm proposed by Freedman et al.. See
Table 2 for the weights used in the EQUAL and HOMOGENEOUS conditions.
Condition 3: HETEROGENEOUS The HETEROGENEOUS algorithm matches participants using the LP in Eq 6. It samples
a BLP function when each vertex is added to the graph, normalizes the scores produced by that function to the range
[0, 1], and uses that function and the profile of the recipient to weight each new outgoing edge. This allows for the
possibility that heterogeneous individual preferences are better captured by a distribution than by a single utility function.
This is the novel algorithm that we propose in this work.
Profile ID EQUAL HOMOGENEOUS
1 1.000 1.000
2 1.000 0.103
3 1.000 0.236
4 1.000 0.036
5 1.000 0.070
6 1.000 0.012
7 1.000 0.024
8 1.000 0.003
Table 2: Patient profile weights for the EQUAL and HOMOGENEOUS experimental conditions. The EQUAL algorithm
values all profiles equally, so all have weight 1.0. However, the HOMOGENEOUS algorithm weights profiles according to
their BT-scores. The HETEROGENEOUS algorithm samples BLP functions throughout matching and so does not have a
static weight for each profile.
4.2 Measures
We evaluate each algorithm according to both the measure we propose in Section 3 and the measure used by Freedman
et al.
Average Rank The average rank of a matching is the average rank of each donation in the matching, where rank(u, v)
of a donation u→ v is as defined in Section 3.3. Recall that lower ranks indicate higher preference satisfaction and,
since there are 8 profiles, all possible ranks fall in the range [1.0, 8.0]. For each run of each algorithm, we recorded the
average rank of every matching in the simulation, then averaged these to get the average rank value for that algorithm.
Proportion Matched The proportion matched of a profile is the proportion of patients of that type that entered the
kidney exchange pool and were subsequently matched. A proportion matched of 100% means that all patients of that
type were matched, and a proportion matched of 0% means that none were. For each run of each algorithm, we recorded
the number of patients with each profile that entered the pool and the number of patients of each profile that were
eventually matched, and used this to calculate proportion matched.
4.3 Experimental Setup
We built a simulator1 to mimic daily matching using the EQUAL, HOMOGENEOUS, or HETEROGENEOUS algorithms based
on previously developed tools [7, 8]. Each simulated “day”, some pairs enter the pool, some pairs exit the pool, and
then the matching algorithm is run on the pairs that remain. The unmatched pairs remain in the pool to potentially be
matched in the future. For each algorithm, we executed 50 runs of 5 years of simulated daily matching, and recorded
the average matching rank and profile proportions matched for each run.
1All code for this paper can be found in the Variation package of github.com/RachelFreedman/KidneyExchange
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Figure 2: Average rank of donations in each simulated run (N = 50). Lower ranks indicate more-preferred matches.
The HETEROGENEOUS algorithm produces the lowest average ranks (median = 3.24), followed by the HOMOGENEOUS
algorithm (median = 3.66), then the EQUAL algorithm (median = 4.06).
5 Results
Average Rank Since lower donation ranks indicate that the recipient is higher in the sampled preference ordering,
we propose that algorithms that induce lower average ranks better satisfy population preferences. As expected, the
proposed HETEROGENEOUS algorithm consistently produces matchings with the lowest average rank (Figure 2). The
HOMOGENEOUS algorithm produces the next-lowest average rank, followed by the EQUAL algorithm, which produces
the highest average rank. This is because the EQUAL algorithm weights all edges equally, matching recipients without
any consideration of the personal characteristics used to define their weight. The HOMOGENEOUS algorithm improves
upon this by considering the characteristics of donation recipients, but fails to approximate preferences as closely as
HETEROGENEOUS.
Proportion Matched Freedman et al. quantified the impact of their modified algorithm by comparing the proportions
of patients of each profile type matched by their algorithm against the proportions matched by the unmodified algorithm,
so for the sake of comparison we do the same. The proportions of each profile matched by the EQUAL algorithm, the
HOMOGENEOUS algorithm (proposed by Freedman et al.) and the HETEROGENEOUS algorithm (proposed in this work)
are shown in Figure 3.
Since it doesn’t take patient profiles into account, the EQUAL algorithm matched approximately the same percentage of
patients across all profiles. Since it prioritizes patients solely based on profile, the HOMOGENEOUS algorithm matched the
more popular profiles (1-3) more often and the less popular profiles (4-8) less. Notably, the HOMOGENEOUS algorithm
almost always matches patients of profile 1, indicating that a patient’s profile can be one of the major factors in
determining whether they receive a kidney. However, the HETEROGENEOUS algorithm prioritizes patients not directly
based on their profile, but based on the sampled BLP function’s valuation of their profile. As a result, this algorithm still
tends to match more of the commonly-preferred profiles and fewer of the commonly-dispreferred ones, but sometimes
samples a BLP function from the tails of the distribution that prioritizes patient profiles very differently.
If the survey preferences had been completely homogeneous, then the HETEROGENEOUS algorithm would have pro-
duced the same results as the HOMOGENEOUS algorithm. However, because preferences expressed in the survey data
sometimes differ from the utility function used for the HOMOGENEOUS algorithm, sometimes different matches are
made. For example, while most survey participants preferred patient profile 1 to all other profiles, some did not, so the
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Figure 3: Proportion of patients of each profile matched in each simulated run (N = 50). All algorithms match
approximately 62% of patients overall, but the HOMOGENEOUS algorithm disproportionately matches profiles with
higher BT-scores, the EQUAL algorithm matches all profiles approximately equally, and the proportions matched by the
HETEROGENEOUS algorithm lie between the other two.
HETEROGENEOUS algorithm respects this heterogeneity by sometimes prioritizing matching other profiles over profile
1. This difference in matching is a further indication that our proposed algorithm more faithfully represents the full
distribution over preferences.
6 Discussion
Faithfully instantiating the collective values of groups with heterogeneous individual preferences is a frequent challenge
for real-world AI systems. For example, we commonly use AI systems to allocate scarce resources – such as kidney
donors, food donations [9] and interview slots [14] – amongst group members in a way that we hope maximizes group
welfare. Moreover, our roads may soon be populated with autonomous vehicles, which will have to make moral tradeoffs
– such determining who to sacrifice in unavoidable collisions [5] – based on the complex and often contradictory moral
frameworks of the communities in which they operate. It is therefore vital that the AI community develop techniques
for faithfully aggregating such heterogeneous preferences and use them to develop socially beneficial AI systems.
In this paper, we proposed, instantiated, and evaluated one such technique for incorporating heterogeneous ethical
preferences into a specific real-world AI system: an algorithm for matching patient-donor pairs in kidney exchange.
Instead of weighting all potential kidney recipients equally, deciding how to prioritize them in an opaque and ad-hoc
way [15], or prioritizing them based on a single static utility function [8], we proposed learning a distribution over
surveyed preferences and then sampling from this distribution for dynamic weighting during matching. We furthermore
proposed donation rank as a better measure of preference satisfaction. We implemented our proposed algorithm and
compare it to predecessor algorithms on a kidney exchange simulation, finding that our algorithm better satisfies survey
participant preferences.
Our model was estimated based on preference data elicited from MTurk survey participants, who are assuredly not
representative of society in general. Future work should elicit preferences from a more representative sample, and
perhaps privilege preferences expressed by domain experts and stakeholders such as doctors, policy-makers and kidney
exchange participants. However, we believe that our sample was not more heterogeneous than the US population as a
whole, so we expect the challenge of heterogeneity and our methodology to continue to be relevant for this expanded
sample. Moreover, since even a representative sample of the general public would still lack relevant domain-specific
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knowledge about kidney transplants, future work should also investigate methodologies that allow domain experts to
correct or moderate the outcomes of this process.
We hope that the challenges highlighted and methodology prototyped in this work will suggest a roadmap for developing
techniques for automating moral decision making in other domains.
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